Tuesday, March 27, 2012

Playing Chicken with Trademark Infringement

I’ve got a new hero.

He’s this guy in Vermont named Bo Muller-Moore.

Apparently he’s a folk artist, and is known for the tee shirts he makes that proclaim “Eat More Kale.” In fact, according to what I’ve read, he’s known as the “Eat More Kale” guy. But really, how much kale can you eat?

Well, Mr. Muller-Moore (aka Mr. EMK) received a letter from the fast food chain, Chick-Fil-A. Now while it’s always nice to receive mail (unless it’s from the IRS), the chain was not offering him any special discounts. Instead, they were threatening to sue him for infringing their registered trademark, “Eat Mor Chikin’.”

Quick trademark primer: The hallmark to any trademark infringement claim is a likelihood of consumer confusion. Specifically, a likelihood of confusion exists when consumers are likely to assume that a product or service is associated with a source other than its actual source because of similarities between the marks or the parties’ marketing techniques. See Metro Publishing Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1993). In fact, all trademark cases, including parodies, are subject to the likelihood of confusion test. See Dr. Seuss Enter. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming preliminary injunction prohibiting publication and distribution of Dr. Juice’s The Cat Not In The Hat, an account of the O.J. Simpson murder trial composed in the styling of Dr. Seuss’ Cat In The Hat); but see Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Mattel, a case in which the toy company sued the record company based on its release of a single entitled “Barbie Girl,” the Ninth Circuit held that there was no trademark infringement because the song was artistically relevant not explicitly misleading as to its source. (You’ll remember the lyrics: “I’m a Barbie girl, in a Barbie world, Life in plastic, it's fantastic/ You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere . . .”) 296 F.3d at 902. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that line of reasoning in another dispute involving the Barbie trademark, Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003), holding that plaintiff’s photographs entitled “Food Chain Barbie” and depicting Barbie in various absurd positions did not infringe on the Barbie trademark because the title was artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading.

Which brings us back to Bo and his shirts. Now a show of hands, please, who believes that these tee-shirts reading “Eat More Kale” are likely to cause consumer confusion with respect to a fast food chair who’s logo is “Eat Mor Chikin’”?

I suppose, in fairness, I should mention the Sleekcraft factors, as these might influence your vote. In AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit set forth the following eight-factor, fact-based test that is now used by most courts to evaluate a likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, (2) the similarity of the marks, (3) the proximity or relatedness of the goods or services, (4) the intent of the defendant in selecting the mark, (5) evidence of actual confusion, (6) the marketing channels used, (7) the likelihood of expansion of product lines, and (8) the degree of care consumers are likely to exercise. Id. at , 348-49.

Ok, now anyone want to change their vote?

It is often said that the sixth factor of the Sleekcraft test, the examination of marketing channels used, which is particularly significant. So here we have national chicken chain (which apparently does not have many outlets in Vermont) and freelance artist located exclusively in Vermont. Hmmm. Well I, for one, am not confused. But maybe that’s just me.

In fact, even if he intended to reference the Chick-folks, I think there’s a good argument that his shirts are artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading. And even if the Chick-chain is entitled to protection in “Eat Mor Chikin’,” just how far does and should this mark really go? How about just “Eat More”? What if I’m obese and believe everyone else should be too, so I start making shirts that say “Eat More.” Does this infringe? Or maybe I’m worried about people who don’t eat enough, so I make a shirt that just says “Eat,” would this infringe? How about a shirt that says “Chicken” and nothing else? What about another frequently consumed animal, e.g. “Fish”? I’m just not sure how far they think this mark extends.

Speaking of overreaching, I need to stretch. Ah, that feels better.

Anyway, so why is Bo my hero? No, it’s not because I love kale (although it is healthy, and I do enjoy it from time to time, and yes I probably should eat more). And no, it’s not because I want to see people needle the big guy. It’s because he’s come up with a very creative solution. Brilliant, in fact.

Rather than shut down and turn over his website as the chicken people want, Bo is making a documentary about his fight, and he is raising the funds to make the film on Kickstarter. Now that is great! Of course, as he acknowledges on his blog, he may not win, but then again, he may (see show of hands, above). And if nothing else, he may end up with a very interesting film. And I’m all in favor of that.

So here’s to you, Bo. You’ve got a fan in me.

Jonathan Pink is an intellectual property attorney in Los Angeles and Orange County. He chairs the Internet and New Media team at Bryan Cave, LLP and can be reached at jonathan.pink@bryancave.com.

Monday, March 26, 2012

Things Are Getting Pinteresting

It seems enough people pinned about Pinterest’s copyright problem that Pinterest decided to changes its Terms of Service and, more importantly, ditch it anti-self-promotion policy.

Pinterest is a UGC site that allows members to “pin” images they’ve found online and share those images with other Pinterest users (including visitors to the site; you don’t have to be a member to see what is posted there). While that may seem a terrific business plan on its face, taking images without permission will likely violate the copyright interest in that image, potentially subjecting Pinterest’s user to a claim of infringement.

Given the site’s inherent copyright problem, a user could effectively avoid violating U.S. copyright laws only by: (1) creating the posted image themselves; (2) obtaining permission to republish from the copyright owner; (3) taking an image in the public domain; or (4) sufficiently transforming the image so that a fair use defense might apply.

Each of these has (or had) its own problem. Let’s start with the last and work our way up.

Not much has been made of the possibility that a fair use defense could apply to Pinterest users’ pinning of copyrighted images. It bears some discussion.

The Copyright Act is not currently equipped to address the complexity of new media. It is supposed to strike a balance between the artist’s right to control her/his work and the public’s need for access to creative works, a balance that is typically expressed as the “fair use” doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. Section 107; Red Lion Broad. V. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (recognizing “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas”); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).

A strong argument can be made that posting of images on Pinterest, especially where accompanied by commentary and insight, constitutes the type of social, political, esthetic exchange of ideas that the fair use doctrine is designed to encourage. Even if this argument requires a bit of legal-shoe-horning, I think it is fair to say that it is this type of flexibility that doctrine must be capable of if it is to fulfill its purpose as a First Amendment safeguard. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). There is no doubt that commentary, criticism and parody are not the only types of expression that provide social benefit and deliver new meaning to a work. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). If so, and if the fair use doctrine is to remains flexible enough to co-exist with contemporary technology, then the use of images in social media should slip comfortably into the fair use “shoe.”

Of course, fair use is a defense. This means that it only applies if and when a suit has been filed. If the goal is to avoid triggering an claim for copyright infringement, then a possible defense may not provide the comfort most social media users are looking for.

That brings us to taking an image in that is in the public domain. This is an easy way to avoid triggering an infringement claim because there work is free for the taking. The only problem is that determining whether an image is in the public domain takes some sleuthing. Generally speaking, images created prior to 1923 are safe. Republish one of those and no one can cry foul. Also safe are images published without a copyright notice between 1923 and 1977. How do you know if they were published without a copyright notice? Not so easy: you have to search the archives to figure this out. Also safe, albeit equally difficult to determine, are those published from 1978 to March 1989 without a notice, and without a subsequent registration. So, while these images may all be “safe” from an infringement perspective, determining whether an image was published with or without an image may be difficult, and those created before 1923 may be too old to interest many social media posters.

So, you’re looking for an easier, fool-proof solution? Ok, one effective solution is to obtain permission to republish from the copyright owner of the desired image. First you have to determine the identity of the owner, then you have to contact that person, and finally you have to obtain their consent. Hey, I said “easier,” not simple. This is because even if you manage to find the copyright owner, she/he may be unwilling to allow you to use their work. This is especially so with a site like Pinterest which states in its terms of use that pinning any image carries with it an implied license permitting any other pinner to repin. Thus, a copyright owner who gives permission to you is, in effect, giving permission to every Pinterest member in the universe to republish as well. Some artists may balk at such broad of a license even if – at first blush -- they were inclined to permit republication by you.

Finally, there is the simple and elegant solution of creating the material that one pins. Setting aside your inability to take a decent picture, Pinterest’s had a prior policy that seemed to discourage creating images that promoted one’s own work. Under the admonition “Avoid Self Promotion,” Pin Etiquette had been that “If there is a photo or project you’re proud of, pin away! However, try not to use Pinterest purely as a tool for self-promotion.” I’m frankly not sure why Pinterest had this policy. I suppose the idea was to legitimately share what interests you, rather than to line your own pockets with your own praise for your own work. So Martha Stewart couldn’t have a board for the myriad of stuff she’s trying to sell. But why not? It seems every third pin board contains an image linking to Martha Stewart, so isn’t that the same as her pinning the images herself?

In any event, Pinterest’s newly revised Pin Etiquette does not include this dictate. Instead, it includes the benign “Pinterest is an expression of who you are. We think being authentic to who you are is more important than getting lots of followers. Being authentic will make Pinterest a better place long-term.” Ok. Whatever that means.

I suppose what this means is that they’ve opened to door (a little wider) to members creating and posting their own material. Will this eliminate the copyright problem inherent in the Pinterest business model? No. The risk that UGC will infringe someone else’s copyright is still very high. In fact, I doubt Pinterest would continue to exist without it. But this is a good move in the right direction. In fact, it’s evolutionary: a development that even might insure Pinterest remains viable long enough to turn a profit.

Feel free to pin – or stick pins in – anything I’ve said.

Jonathan Pink is an intellectual property attorney located in Los Angeles and Orange County. He leads the Internet and New Media Team at Bryan Cave, LLP, and can be reached at jonthan.pink@bryancave.com.

Monday, March 19, 2012

Follow-Up on "Bon Victoire" Post

Every so often, someone reads my blog. Here's a response I received from one of the attorneys in the Bon Jovi case that I reported on about a month ago. (The email is reprinted in its entirety, with permission from the author.)

Mr. Pink – I tried to post a comment on your fine blog, but apparently went over the word limit, so rather than cut it down, I’m only e-mailing it to you, at least for now.

(Attempted) post is below.

Warm regards,


Mr. Pink:

I represent Mr. Steele in the cases discussed in this post. Snarky comments aside (in reality, Mr. Bongiovi has a long and well-documented history of “steal[ing]” other people’s songs), you have your facts – and the law of the case – flat wrong.

I know it’s a lot to ask to read the file, briefs, or anything other than the First Circuit’s three or four sentence-long “judgments” prior to posting, but your failure to do so here renders your analysis meaningless (other than your self-explanatory quotes from non-First Circuit decisions).

First, as to proving defendant copied the work, defendants in the district court actually admitted access to Steele’s work no later than October 2004, over four years prior to Steele filing suit.

Second, the district court – in a break from First Circuit precedent and practice – issued an order, at defendants’ urging, prohibiting any discovery as to probative similarity, i.e., “actual copying.” The district court instead limited the scope of discovery – and the dispositive issue at summary judgment – to expert analysis of “substantial similarity.” An aside: Mr. Steele faced Skadden pro se during the entirety of the initial district court proceedings.

Nonetheless, Mr. Steele alleged and argued direct copying in the form of digital reproduction in the district court. As several of the defendants know from their own infringement prosecutions, where digital reproduction – for example, downloading a song from a file-sharing site like Napster – can be proven, it is the beginning and end of the infringement analysis.

Mr. Steele argued that defendants duplicated his song and used it as a temp track in their video editing suites, specifically those of TBS Studios and/or MLB Advanced Media, L.P. (which happens to own and run Bon Jovi’s website, among many other non-baseball digital properties). Defendants – in three and a half years of litigation – have never denied using Mr. Steele’s song as a temp track, likely because the evidence of temp-tracking here is impossible to refute (read Mr. Steele’s complaint and/or briefs on appeal for the evidence on this).

Funny thing: MLB Advanced Media, L.P. – the target defendant, being the claimed copyright owner to the infringing work - was properly served but willfully defaulted in Steele’s first (pro se) case. Another funny thing: An unserved entity, Major League Baseball Properties, Inc., voluntarily appeared, claiming – falsely (this is undisputed) – to be MLB Advanced Media, L.P. Unsurprisingly, the pro se Steele didn’t catch this. Nor did he catch that defendants filed a false version of the infringing work in the district court, from which MLB Advanced Media, L.P.’s copyright notice had been deleted (also undisputed).

But I digress. It is, however, worth noting that these cases long ago stopped being about infringement – again, never denied or disputed – and instead have revealed Skadden’s multi-year, multi-jurisdiction, and jaw-droppingly brazen fraud on the court.

Back to infringement. The district court’s strange order precluding discovery – and adjudication – of access and copying put Mr. Steele in the difficult situation of trying to prove defendants’ digital duplication of his song for use as an audiovisual temp track by showing that defendants’ audiovisual work was substantially similar to Mr. Steele’s song. As you may know, there are no published decisions on temp-tracking, though it is universally acknowledged – where the temp track is used without the owner’s permission – to constitute infringement.

So, while your citations and quotations are no doubt accurate, you leave out that the district court failed to follow those decisions (or, more accurately, similar decisions in the First Circuit). Skadden successfully pushed for this truncated analysis knowing that discovery of digital files from defendants’ video editing suites would quickly confirm infringing duplication. On the other hand, Steele would face an uphill battle in showing substantial similarity between his song and defendants’ audiovisual.

The district court’s decision leaves no doubt that Skadden succeeded: the district court’s attempted song-audiovisual substantial similarity analysis is confusing and, where it addresses synchronization rights, not only legally incorrect, but nonsensical. The much simpler route would have been to follow the well-established two-step analysis of probative similarity followed by substantial similarity. Here – as in illegal downloading cases – the first step would likely have been dispositive of actual copying (duplication) and, therefore, of infringement. Such “direct evidence” of copying is, I submit, no longer “rare,” as described by numerous decisions, including in the First Circuit, at least in cases of digital infringement.

Temp-tracking is a secretive process because it often involves infringement. Accordingly, evidence of probative similarity (direct evidence of copying) in such cases would not only provide conclusive evidence of infringement, but possibly the only evidence. Mr. Steele was instead forced to prove digital duplication through the unnecessarily circuitous route of expert testimony as to substantial similarity between his song and defendants’ audiovisual.

The First Circuit’s “own independent review” finding that no reasonable juror could find probative similarity was, therefore, necessarily limited, if not impossible because such evidence was specifically forbidden from the district court proceedings. Nonetheless, the record was replete with evidence of substantial similarity – despite the district court’s limited discovery order – including, among other things, that both works were identical in length (to the tenth-second); that 96% of defendants’ audiovisual’s frame “cuts” were beat- or tempo- matched to Mr. Steele’s song (irrefutable – and, in any event, undisputed - evidence of temp-tracking); and that over a dozen affiants had sworn to the works’ similarities and/or being confused upon viewing the audiovisual for the first time, believing it to be a derivative of Steele’s song.

There is much more to this story, if you care to take the time to read the papers. If you do, I think you would agree that “knowledgeable counsel” would have, as I have, continued to “press on.”

You suspect correctly: It is not over yet.

Christopher A.D. Hunt

The Hunt Law Firm LLC

10 Heron Lane

Hopedale, MA 01747

(508) 966-7300


Thursday, March 15, 2012


Sort of surprised at all the (P)interest in Pinterest, or at least in the copyright issues surrounding it.

I was interviewed by the Wall Street Journal about the use of non-user generated content posted as UGC on the site. That is, taking someone else’s images and pinning them to the Pinterest user’s on pinboard.

The first thing I told the Journal is that there's a decent fair use argument here. There are many uses beyond straight commentary that deliver new meaning while still providing important social benefits (comparable to commentary or criticism) that the fair use doctrine aims to protect. The fair use doctrine has to remain flexible enough to recognize the complications of contemporary technology if it's to remain a true First Amendment safeguard. Maybe this requires amending the Copyright Act. Uh, certainly, this involves amending the Copyright Act.

Of course technology evolves so quickly that striving to have the Act keep up with it is a little like using a bicycle to chase a speeding Viper. I don’t care how good a cyclist you are, you’ll never catch up. (In homage to Roger Corman: Eat My Dust.)

The Wall Street Journal reporter took all that down, then called back and said: Just give me the dos and don'ts. Here’s a link to the article: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/03/13/dont-get-stuck-by-pinterest-lawyers-warn/?mod=WSJBlog.

Those comments, by-the-by, led to a radio interview on the same topic on the Victoria Taft Show. A link to that is right here: http://stationcaster.com/player_skinned.php?s=99&c=849&f=444791 .

Between those two pieces, I’ve said everything I have to about this issue. A far more interesting issue (or two), was noted by the esteemed scholar, Eric Goldman (who everyone should read if they don’t already).

Eric opined in a Facebook discussion yesterday that the two really interesting points about Pinterest are: “(1) it's a site that surely would never grow to maturity in a SOPA world as opposed to a DMCA 512(c) world because the copyright concerns would have taken it out without any 512(c)(3) takedown notices being filed, and (2) it came out of nowhere to become a major threat to Facebook, reminding us that the next wave of innovation is nowhere on our radar screen today, and locking in the existing competitive environment would be a huge mistake.”

Now that’s thinking! Those are by far the most interesting points I’ve heard about Pinterest. So pin that.

Jonathan Pink is an intellectual property attorney resident in the Los Angeles and Orange County offices of Bryan Cave, LLP. He can be reached at jonathan.pink@bryancave.com.

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

Louis Vuitton Threatens Law School? This Little One's Not Worth the Trouble

You’ve got to admire Louis Vuitton. They aggressively pursue alleged infringers of their trademarks.

There’s the recent case of Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) in which the Ninth Circuit held that a web-hosting company was liable for contributory copyright and trademark infringement when it failed to take steps to stop alleged infringement committed by Chinese websites which had used its servers.

There was Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, in which the House of Louis sued a company that sold a parody pet product called Chewy Vuitton: a chew toy that resembled a Louis Vuitton handbag. (The Fourth Circuit ruled that the toy, which included a number of dissimilarities to the real bag, was a parody and thus did not infringe Louis Vuitton’s trademark.)

And the suit against Warner Brothers for its use of a counterfeit LV bag in “The Hangover Part II” (Zach Galifianakis warns his cohort not to sit on his Louis Vuitton bag, “Careful, that is a Louis Vuitton.”)

Now, LV has set its sights on the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Penn Law included a version of the LV logo/design on a student flyer advertising a conference on intellectual property infringement in the fashion industry.

Specifically, the flyer showed those flowery, circley and diamondy shaped images that LV is known for. The flyer intermixed those images with some stylized ones to make a point about the discussion. They included circle-cs (for copyright) and TMs (for trademark). Get it?

Louis Vuitton's director of civil enforcement for North America did, and he didn’t like it. He wrote to the law school's dean, saying Louis Vuitton had “created the Toile Monogram pattern” (that’s what those clover and star things are called) “in the 1890’s to protect the Louis Vuitton brand from unlawful imitators.”

He was "dismayed" that the school’s Intellectual Property Group had "misappropriated and modified the LV Trademarks and Toile Monogram as the background for its invitation to [its] . . . Annual Symposium on ‘IP Issues in Fashion Law’", calling such conduct “egregious” and predicting that it would dilute the LV Trademarks and could lead others to think that that it’s ok.

The coffee machine must work overtime at Louis Vuitton. They may want to consider laying off the caffeine.

The letter from LV’s counsel goes on to chastise the law school like a parent ripping into a kid for running across the street without looking first: “I would have thought the Penn Intellectual Property Group, and its faculty advisors, would understand the basics of intellectual property law and know better than to infringe and dilute the famous trademarks of fashion brands, including the LV Trademarks, for a symposium on fashion law."

In my house we would have taken away the school’s treats for the day. I’m wondering if LV considered rejected this as being too harsh.

Perhaps I’m naively optimistic, but I just don’t think most people are going to confuse the law school’s use of the LV marks with LV’s participation in, sponsorship or support of the school’s program. After all, all the participants were listed on the flyer, and LV wasn’t one of them.

The University of Pennsylvania's associate general counsel wrote back to LV. In his letter, he noted that the Lanham Act "expressly protects a noncommercial use of a mark and a parody from any claim for dilution" and that, in order to infringe LV’s marks, the school would have had to have used the marks in interstate commerce in a manner likely to cause confusion between "Louis Vuitton's luxury apparel goods and [the student group's] educational conference among the relevant audience."

He says he’s not going to tell the Intellectual Property Group to discontinue its use of the image, and invites LV’s counsel to attend the symposium.


I suppose LV’s counsel has reason to be concerned about fair use. It’s a good defense in some instances, such as when a mark is used in a descriptive sense. See e.g. Radio Channel Networks, Inc. v. Broadcast. Com, Inc. 1999 WL 124455 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d w/out opinion, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999) (use of term “radio channel” to label one of several website groupings of streaming programming held to be descriptive); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff’s product is acceptable); Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F. 3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (use of plaintiff’s mark to identify defendant was not infringing).

Still, that doesn’t really fit this fact pattern.

Rather, this is closer to incidental use which is so de minimis that no infringement can be found, or better yet, how about the First Amendment? A trademark may develop into a cultural icon that becomes a referent for purposes of social commentary. See e.g. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 202 WL 1628504 at *2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”)

This is similar to the parody defense that school’s counsel mentioned. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F. 3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994) (use of a trademark to comment on or criticize the trademark, its owner, or the products and services marketed with the trademark may constitute a defense to an action for trademark infringement).

But the one I like best of all, is that there simply is no likelihood of confusion by the likely viewers (law students, IP lawyers, etc.) as to the source, sponsorship or affiliation with respect to the plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. Section 1114; Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d cir. 1979) (“The public’s belief that the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies the confusion requirement.”).

Is the use of those marks on a law school flyer for a Symposium on “IP Issues in Fashion Law" really going to dilute the LV trademarks?

To quote from that great bar scene in Star Wars, Episode IV (after Ponda Baba gives Luke a rough shove and starts yelling at him in an alien language Luke doesn't understand):

Dr. Evazan (grabbing Luke) I don't like you either. You just watch yourself. We're wanted men. I have the death sentence on twelve systems.
Luke: I'll be careful.
Dr. Evazan: You'll be dead!
Obi-Wan: (intervening) This little one's not worth the effort. Come, let me get you something.
(Dr. Evazan shoves Luke across the room and pulls out a blaster, at which point Obi-Wan ignites his light saber and severs Ponda Baba's arm.)

This little one’s not worth the effort. LV should show up for the symposium and speak its mind. Beyond that, and knocking off the coffee, they should think twice before making an issue out of something like this . . . before they lose an arm and have no place to hang their bag.

Jonathan Pink is an intellectual property attorney at Bryan Cave, LLP. He is resident in the firm’s Los Angeles and Orange County (Irvine) offices. He can be reached at jonathan.pink@bryancave.com or 949-223-7173.